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COSTS  AND  CHALLENGES  OF  THE
HOSTILE AUDIENCE
Frederick Schauer*
In my own newly famous city of Charlottesville, Virginia,1 as well as in
Berkeley,2 Boston,3 Gainesville,4 Middlebury,5 and an increasing number of
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and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
This Article was written for the Notre Dame Law Review’s Symposium on The Marketplace of
Ideas a Century Later.  An earlier version of this Article was prepared, under the title, The
Hostile Audience Revisited, for the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
as part of their “Emerging Threats” Series, and was presented as well to the faculty at Penn
State Law.  I am grateful to Leslie Kendrick, David Pozen, and Alex Tsesis for valuable
comments on earlier drafts, and to my colleagues Ken Abraham, Rachel Harmon, John
Harrison, Risa Goluboff, and Ted White for useful information, challenging perspectives,
and the patience to endure far too many of my questions.
1 For extensive description and analysis of the now-notorious events arising out of the
“Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville in August 2017, see Frederick Schauer, In the
Shadow of the First Amendment, in CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017: THE LEGACY OF RACE AND INEQUITY
63 (Louis P. Nelson & Claudrena N. Harold eds., 2018).  The most detailed account of all
that took place is contained in the report commissioned after the events by the City of
Charlottesville. HUNTON & WILLIAMS, FINAL REPORT: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE 2017
PROTEST EVENTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA (2017), https://www.huntonak.com/
images/content/3/4/v2/34613/final-report-ada-compliant-ready.pdf.  For a brief discus-
sion of the events leading up to the protest, see Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No.
3:17CV00056, 2017 WL 3474071 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2017), which enjoined Charlottesville
from requiring relocation of the previously authorized rally.  And although the ninety-six
page complaint in the civil action of Sines v. Kessler is only a complaint and neither an
adjudication nor an unbiased account, it contains a wealth of valuable and seemingly accu-
rate information about the events at issue. See Complaint, Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d
765 (W.D. Va. 2018) (No. 3:17-CV-00072).  Much of this is also explored and explained in
the court’s opinion. See Sines, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765 (denying motion to dismiss).
2 See Jacey Fortin, Free Speech Week at Berkeley Is Canceled, but Milo Yiannopoulos Still Plans
to Talk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/09/23/us/milo-berkeley-free-
speech; see also Madison Park, Ben Shapiro Spoke at Berkeley as Protesters Gathered Outside, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/us/berkeley-ben-shapiro-speech/index.html (last
updated Sept. 15, 2017) (discussing the events surrounding a speech at Berkeley by Ben
Shapiro).
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other locations,6 individuals and groups engaging in constitutionally pro-
tected acts of speaking, marching, parading, protesting, rallying, and demon-
strating have become targets for often-large groups of often-disruptive
counterprotesters.7  And although most of the contemporary events have
involved neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, and other white supremacist speakers who
are met with opposition from audiences on the political left, it has not always
been so.  Indeed, what we now identify as the problem of the hostile audi-
ence8 has often involved more sympathetic speakers confronted by less sym-
pathetic audiences.9  Yet although the issue is hardly of recent vintage,
contemporary events have highlighted the importance of reviewing the rele-
vant constitutional doctrine and of thinking again and anew about how, if at
all, the government and the law should respond to the disruptive audience.
Indeed, the immediacy of the issue is exacerbated by the way in which
existing legal doctrine on the question is less clear than is often supposed.  It
is now widely believed that restricting the speaker on account of the actual or
predicted hostile and potentially violent reaction of the audience gets our
3 See Katie Reilly, Thousands of Counter-Protesters March Against White Nationalism in Bos-
ton a Week After Charlottesville, TIME, www.time.com/4907681/boston-free-speech-rally-pro-
tests-charlottesville (last updated Aug. 19, 2017).
4 See Frank Cerabino, White Nationalist Rally in Gainesville Was Storm That Fizzled, PALM
BEACH POST (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/white-nationalist-
rally-gainesville-was-storm-that-fizzled/GDqg4AM6NX8dGsHZvr8iIM/.
5 See Stephanie Saul, Dozens of Middlebury Students Are Disciplined for Charles Murray Pro-
test, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/us/middlebury-college-
charles.  Whether Charles Murray, the W.H. Brady Scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute and coauthor of The Bell Curve, written with Richard J. Herrnstein, is accurately or
fairly grouped with the white supremacist protesters in Charlottesville, Berkeley, Boston,
and Gainesville is deeply contested.
6 Including, of course, the District of Columbia.  An August 12, 2018, rally in Lafay-
ette Park, organized by Jason Kessler, the organizer of the Charlottesville rally exactly a
year earlier, featured a small number of protesters who were vastly outnumbered by the
counterprotesters. See Joe Heim et al., Protest Dwarfs ‘Unite the Right’ Rally, WASH. POST,
Aug. 13, 2018, at A1.
7 Because many of the recently prominent events have commenced, as in Charlottes-
ville, with groups objecting to what they perceive to be excess government, rampant liber-
alism, and too little concern for white people, contemporary discourse often describes
these groups as “protesters” and those challenging them as “counterprotestors.”  I will
adhere to this usage, even while recognizing that some speakers who attract audience hos-
tility are not protesting anything, thus making the designation “counterprotestors” some-
what of a misnomer.
8 The label “hostile audience” dates in the caselaw to Chief Justice Vinson’s majority
opinion in Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951), but appeared earlier in academic
commentary.  See Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1118 (1949).
9 See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (invalidating restrictions on
civil rights demonstrators); Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. Unit A
Dec. 1981) (same); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) (protecting
antiwar protestors); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F.
Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (protecting civil rights parade).
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First Amendment priorities backward.10  But it is hardly clear that this belief
was ever correct, and, even if it were, it is even less clear that it is sufficient to
deal with the constitutional and policy complexities of many of the contem-
porary encounters.11  It seems appropriate now to revisit this problem of the
hostile audience, not so much to urge a change in existing understandings
and legal doctrine as to emphasize how many open questions still remain,
and how current events might bear on possible answers to these questions.
I. THE FORGOTTEN DENOUEMENT OF A REMEMBERED EVENT
As has been extensively documented,12 in 1977 a group called the
National Socialist Party of America, self-described as Nazis and led by a man
named Frank Collin, proposed to conduct a march in Skokie, Illinois.  The
neo-Nazi marchers chose Skokie as their venue precisely because of its sub-
stantial Jewish population,13 which at the time contained an especially large
number of Holocaust survivors.14  And not only did the neo-Nazis select Sko-
kie as a venue in order to inflict the maximum amount of mental distress on
Jewish residents, but marchers also, and for the same reason, planned to
carry Nazi flags, display the swastika, and wear Nazi uniforms, jackboots and
all.15
10 See, e.g., Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 248 (6th Cir. 2015); Vincent
Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (1990); Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the
Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 1555–57 (2017); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 237–39 (1983).
11 For some of the academic articles inspired by Charlottesville and other recent
events, see Timothy E.D. Horley, Essay, Rethinking the Heckler’s Veto After Charlottesville, 104
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 8 (2018); JD Hsin, Defending the Public’s Forum: Theory and Doctrine in the
Problem of Provocative Speech, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1099 (2018); Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s
Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions
Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175 (2016); R. George Wright, The Heck-
ler’s Veto Today, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 159 (2017).
12 Comprehensive accounts and analyses of the Skokie controversy include DONALD
ALEXANDER DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE (1985); JAMES L. GIBSON & RICHARD D. BINGHAM, CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND NAZIS (1985); DAVID HAMLIN, THE NAZI/SKOKIE CONFLICT (1980); ARYEH
NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM
(Int’l Debate Educ. Ass’n 2012) (1979); PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME TO SKOKIE
(1999); David Goldberger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic Harm as a Basis for
Suppressing Racist, Sexist and Ethnically Offensive Speech, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (1991).
13 Geoffrey R. Stone, Remembering the Nazis in Skokie, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2009,
5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/remembering-the-nazis-
in_b_188739.html.  A majority of the town’s population in 1977 was Jewish, although prior
to World War II Skokie was heavily populated by Christians of German ancestry. See LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 26 (1986).
14 Approximately five thousand.  Stone, supra note 13.
15 There is no indication that the neo-Nazis in Skokie had planned to carry firearms,
but now, in Charlottesville and elsewhere, protesters (and sometimes counterprotestors)
with firearms add an entirely new dimension (including a new constitutional dimension
after District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
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Despite the efforts of the Village of Skokie16 to prohibit the event, the
Nazis’ First Amendment right to hold the march was upheld both by the
Supreme Court of Illinois17 and by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit.18  And although the United States Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari19 was technically not a decision on the merits,20 the
events were so prominently publicized that the Court’s refusal to hear the
case with full briefing and argument was widely understood by the public,
and presumably by the members of the Court as well, as a strong statement
that the Nazis’ right to march was by then clearly established in constitutional
doctrine.21
Although the Nazis prevailed in several courts and thus won their right
to march when, where, and how they had proposed, it is often forgotten that
the march never happened.  The Nazis wrapped themselves in their legal
victory, but at no time did they actually exercise, at least in Skokie itself, the
right that they had won in court.  They did hold similar but small events in
Chicago on June 24 and July 9, 1978, both without benefit of permit, but the
permit they were eventually granted to march in Skokie on June 25 remained
unused.22
We are still not sure why the Nazis never marched in Skokie.  Perhaps
they disbelieved Skokie’s representation that the town would make “every
effort to protect the demonstrat[ion] . . . from responsive violence.”23  Per-
haps the Nazis viewed their legal victory as more important than the march
U.S. 742 (2010)) to the problem of confrontational speech in the public forum, a dimen-
sion not discussed in this Article.  For a good recent analysis, see Timothy Zick, Arming
Public Protests, 104 IOWA L. REV. 223 (2018).
16 In the ensuing litigation, Skokie stressed its official designation as a “village,” pre-
sumably as a way of suggesting a small and close community. See BOLLINGER, supra note 13,
at 26.  But with a population of over sixty thousand and contiguous with Chicago, Skokie,
then and now, is described more accurately as a large suburb than as a village. See id.;
Stone, supra note 13.
17 Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978), aff’g in part
and rev’g in part 366 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
18 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
19 Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (denying certiorari); Nat’l Socialist Party of
Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (staying injunction against the
march).
20 See Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 917–20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
21 The conclusion that the Nazis plainly had a First Amendment right to march follows
from some combination of by-then-entrenched Supreme Court decisions. See Police Dep’t
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (announcing the presumption against content discrimina-
tion); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (disallowing offense to unwilling viewers as a
justification for restriction); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (pro-
tecting Ku Klux Klan speaker from prosecution for advocating racial violence); Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (recognizing the streets as public forums).
22 Irving Louis Horowitz & Victoria Curtis Bramson, Skokie, the ACLU and the Endurance
of Democratic Theory, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 328, 330 (1979).
23 Collin, 578 F.2d at 1203 n.10.
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itself.  Or perhaps the publicity surrounding the event made it seem more
desirable to the Nazis to march in front of what they hoped would be a larger
audience in Chicago.  But whatever the reason, the Nazis never marched in
Skokie, and thus we do not know what actually would have transpired in Sko-
kie had the Nazis elected to march there.
Because the Skokie march did not take place, we can only speculate
about the answers to some number of further potential questions.  Some of
those questions relate to law enforcement.  Assuming that there would have
been far more objectors than Nazis24—far more counterprotesters than
protesters, in the contemporary terminology—and that at least some of those
objectors would have been inclined to physically confront or assault the
marchers, would the Skokie police department have attempted to prevent
the physical encounters and, if so, how, and with how large a force, and with
what degree of aggressiveness?  And if Skokie’s police department, even
assuming its best efforts, had not been up to the task simply because of the
sheer size and anger of the hostile audience, would the Illinois State Police
have stepped in?  The Cook County Sheriff’s Office?  The Illinois National
Guard?  Would Illinois state authorities have requested federal assistance to
protect the exercise of what was and still is, after all, a federal constitutional
right?25  Would federal force have been employed to enforce a constitutional
right and a judicial order, even absent a request from the state, as happened
when President Eisenhower sent federal troops to Little Rock in 1957?26
These are all factual and historical questions rather than normative or doctri-
nal ones, but they suggest a number of issues that are indeed normative or
24 As, for example, in the rally in the District of Columbia marking the one-year anni-
versary of the original Charlottesville events, a rally that, to the disappointment of the
organizers, drew only two dozen protesters and thousands of counterprotesters. See Ginger
Gibson & Jonathan Landay, Washington White Nationalist Rally Sputters in Sea of Counterprotes-
ters, REUTERS (Aug. 12, 2018), www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-protests-washington/wash-
ington-white-nationalist-rally-sputters-in-sea-of-counterprotesters-idUSKBN1KX0BF.
25 Consider, for example, the (eventual) decision by President Eisenhower in 1957 to
send federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce Supreme Court and lower federal
court desegregation rulings that had been resisted not only by much of the local citizenry,
but also by state and local officials, most prominently Governor Orval Faubus. See Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1984); JAMES F. SIMON, EISENHOWER VS. WARREN: THE BATTLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 290–324 (2018).  Conceptually, legally, and constitutionally, the
events in Little Rock and Skokie may not be as different as the moral gulf between the
Nazis and the fighters for desegregation in Little Rock might initially suggest.  The Skokie
Nazis could have been described as a group seeking to exercise a federal constitutional
right that had been explicitly recognized in their case with a federal court injunction
against various state officials, just as the basis for Eisenhower’s directive was the need to
protect a federal judicial order against state officials set on resisting rather than obeying.
We do not know what, if anything, President Carter or other federal officials would have
done in Skokie had state and local officials either resisted the order, or, more likely,
obeyed it only grudgingly and with little expenditure of human and financial resources,
but the parallels remain intriguing.
26 See discussion supra note 25.
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doctrinal, or both, about which the current doctrine provides few answers.
The question presented by the Nazis’ nonmarch in Skokie, and the question
presented by so many of the contemporary events, is thus the question of the
hostile audience: Assuming the existence of a group or of individuals other-
wise constitutionally entitled to say what they want to say where they want to
say it, or where they would otherwise be allowed or authorized to say it, then
how does the existence of an actually or potentially hostile audience change,
if at all, the nature of the speaker’s rights or alter, if at all, the obligation, if
any, of official responsibility to protect the speakers and their speech?
II. THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION—HOLES AND ALL
One motivation for this Article, even apart from the way in which cur-
rent events have highlighted the problem of the hostile audience, is that
there is less settled law on the questions raised at the close of Part I than we
might have supposed.  But what law there is dates to 1940, and the case of
Cantwell v. Connecticut.27  Jesse Cantwell, like so many of the individuals who
helped forge the modern First Amendment tradition, was a Jehovah’s Wit-
ness.28  He, along with his brother and father, set himself up on a street cor-
ner in New Haven, where he attempted to sell books and pamphlets in a
neighborhood that was approximately ninety percent Catholic, while also
playing a phonograph record vehemently attacking the Catholic Church.29
The content of the record angered several onlookers, one of whom testified
that he “felt like hitting” Cantwell if Cantwell did not leave immediately.30  In
fact, he did leave when confronted, but Cantwell, his brother, and his father
were nevertheless charged with “breach of the peace” under Connecticut
law.31  The convictions of the brother and father were reversed by the
Supreme Court of Connecticut, but Jesse’s was upheld.32  The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, reversed the conviction as a violation of the First Amend-
ment, with Justice Roberts writing the unanimous opinion.33  The Court did
hold out the possibility that a conviction might be upheld were a speaker to
use profane words, indecent language, epithets, or personal abuse directed
27 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
28 Id. at 300; see, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (invalidating standar-
dless requirement to obtain permission before using public park for demonstration);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (applying First Amendment to company-owned
town); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (following Schneider and Lovell);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating blanket prohibition on door-to-
door religious and political canvassing); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(same); see also Neil M. Richards, The “Good War,” the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and the First Amend-
ment, 87 VA. L. REV. 781, 782 (2001) (book review ) (“It is remarkable that virtually all of
these [First Amendment] cases involved a single group of litigants—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses . . . .”).
29 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 300–01.
30 Id. at 309.
31 See id. at 303.
32 State v. Cantwell, 8 A.2d 533 (Conn. 1939), rev’d, 310 U.S. 296.
33 Cantwell, 310 U.S. 296.
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specifically at particular listeners,34 or were a statute to have been aimed pre-
cisely at conduct such as Cantwell’s and have incorporated a legislative find-
ing that such conduct constituted a clear and present danger.35  But because
Cantwell was prosecuted only under the general common-law notion of
breach of the peace,36 and because there had been no profane or indecent
direct personal abuse, the Court concluded that Cantwell’s conviction could
not stand.37
Although the Cantwell Court did suggest that the reactions of listeners
could justify punishing a speaker if the speaker had targeted specific listeners
with profane, indecent, or abusive language,38 or if a legislature had speci-
fied the kind of language that might create a clear and present danger on the
basis of listener reaction,39 the case says next to nothing about what a legisla-
ture would need to specify to meet this standard, and nothing at all about
whether speakers, as opposed to listeners, could be the appropriate objects of
legal sanction.  And because the audience in Cantwell consisted only of a few
people to whom Cantwell had generally addressed his words and his record-
ing, the decision in its entirety is at best a precursor to the hostile audience
problem, and appears to be more of an angered-listener case than a hostile
audience one.40  The first true hostile audience case was yet to come, but
arrived nine years after Cantwell, in Terminiello v. Chicago,41 a decision worthy
of more extended discussion.
Arthur Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest, had been invited to
Chicago from Birmingham, Alabama, to deliver a well-publicized and viru-
lent anticommunist and anti-Semitic speech.  In the speech, Terminiello
referred, inter alia, to “atheistic, communistic . . . Zionist Jews” as “slimy
scum,” accused former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau of plot-
ting to cut off the limbs of German babies, charged Franklin and Eleanor
Roosevelt and the Supreme Court with being part of the same Jewish commu-
nist conspiracy, and announced that the New Deal itself was among the
34 Id. at 309–10.
35 Id. at 307–08, 311.
36 Id. at 308.
37 Id. at 309–11.
38 Id. at 309.
39 Id. at 311.
40 Although no clear precedent existed when Cantwell was decided on the impermissi-
bility of allowing the presence of angered or offended listeners or viewers to justify restric-
tions on a speaker, subsequent cases made clear what seems only implicit in Cantwell. See,
e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (protecting flag desecration); Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (protecting publicly visible nonobscene nudity);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting offensive language).  For more recent
but somewhat less explicit examples, see Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (protecting
offensive funeral protest), Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (protecting nontargeted
cross burning), R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (same).
41 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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prominent manifestations of this conspiracy.42  Terminiello’s audience in a
rented hall consisted of somewhere between eight hundred and one thou-
sand people, most of them sympathetic but some hostile.43  Outside the hall
gathered another two to three hundred more people who had been turned
away for reasons of space, an additional several hundred members of a picket
line, and more than one thousand other protesters, all of whom were being
monitored by seventy police officers.44  The police presence turned out to be
nowhere near sufficient to prevent the pushing, milling, fighting, and rioting
that broke out both inside and outside the hall, and the disorder was marked
by the throwing of stones, sticks, bricks, bottles, and other makeshift weap-
ons.45  In response to this tumult, Terminiello was arrested, tried, and con-
victed for breach of the peace, and fined one hundred dollars.46
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas wrote for a 5–4 major-
ity, relying heavily on Stromberg v. California47 and reversing Terminiello’s
conviction, largely because the ordinance under which Terminiello had been
convicted made it an “offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a
condition of unrest.”48  Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter dis-
sented, but it was Justice Jackson’s dissent, joined by Justice Burton, which
focused most closely both on what Terminiello had said and on the disorder
that had ensued.49  On his reading of the events, Jackson concluded that the
existence of a “riot and . . . a speech that provoked a hostile mob and incited
a friendly one”50 justified Terminiello’s conviction.  Jackson did not, how-
ever, draw much of a distinction between the hostile and the friendly mobs,
and thus did not distinguish Terminiello’s responsibility for the actions of
the supporters he incited from his responsibility for the reactions of the
opponents he angered.  And thus, although the question of the hostile audi-
ence was plainly on the table in Terminiello, the Supreme Court’s decision still
produced little guidance about the extent to which a speaker might be
responsible not for what he urged others to do, but instead for what his
words might prompt others to do to him and his supporters.
42 Id. at 14–22 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Terminiello’s
speech).  The most extensive discussions of the facts can be found in the state court deci-
sions. See City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 79 N.E.2d 39 (Ill. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 1; City of
Chicago v. Terminiello, 74 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947), aff’d, 79 N.E.2d 39, rev’d, 337
U.S. 1.
43 Terminiello, 79 N.E.2d at 41.
44 Id.
45 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 16 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
46 See 79 N.E.2d at 41; 74 N.E.2d at 46.
47 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Stromberg is remembered now more for holding that the dis-
play of a red flag was a form of speech covered and protected by the First Amendment, but
its contribution to public forum and hostile audience doctrine should not be forgotten.
48 Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 6.
49 Id. at 6, 8, 13–37.
50 Id. at 13 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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The Terminiello scenario was repeated, albeit on a smaller scale, two years
later in Feiner v. New York,51 noteworthy in part for being the first judicial use
of the term “hostile audience.”52  But again, the facts of the case made the
conclusions to be drawn from it less than crystal clear.  Irving Feiner had
made a speech in Syracuse criticizing President Truman, the Mayor of Syra-
cuse, the American Legion, and others, but the main import of his open-air
address to a racially mixed crowd of seventy-five to eighty was “to arouse the
Negro people against the whites,”53 a message that, not surprisingly, pro-
duced an angry crowd that appeared to the police that were present to be on
the verge of erupting into a number of racially charged fights.54  The police
first requested and then demanded that Feiner stop talking.55  This he
refused to do, and so he was accordingly arrested for disorderly conduct.56
His conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals57 and then by
the Supreme Court, the latter, in an opinion written by Vinson, observing
that
[i]t is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for
the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here
the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes
incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.58
Justice Black dissented,59 as did Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Minton,60
all of them relying heavily on Cantwell and on their belief that the real prob-
lem was the presence of police who saw their job more as siding with the
hostile part of the audience than protecting the speaker.
Feiner is commonly taken to represent the extreme case of allowing the
hostile audience to exercise the so-called heckler’s veto,61 but a close reading
of the opinion makes that conclusion not nearly so obvious.  Was Feiner
charged with provoking a hostile audience or instead with inciting a sympa-
thetic one?  Was his wrong in making his speech or in disobeying the plausi-
51 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
52 Id. at 320.
53 Id. at 316–17.
54 Id. at 317–18.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 318.
57 People v. Feiner, 91 N.E.2d 316 (N.Y. 1950).
58 Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321.
59 Id. at 321 (Black, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 329 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61 HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 89–90
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988); see also Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for
Democratic Discourse, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1308–09 (2007); Ruth McGaffey, The Heck-
ler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 39, 50 (1973).  Not surprisingly, recent events
have prompted renewed attention to the idea of a heckler’s veto. See Clay Calvert, Reconsid-
ering Incitement, Tinker and the Heckler’s Veto on College Campuses: Richard Spencer and the Char-
lottesville Factor, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 109 (2018); Horley, supra note 11; Wright,
supra note 11.
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ble orders of the police?  Could he, as a lone speaker, have been physically
removed rather than arrested?62  Should he have been?
Although Feiner is hazy in just these ways, the decisions that mark Feiner’s
burial contain fewer uncertainties.  In three different 1960s cases dealing
with civil rights demonstrators and unambiguously hostile audiences, the
Supreme Court appears to have eviscerated Feiner of whatever authority it
may once have had.  In Edwards v. South Carolina, an 8–1 Supreme Court
reversed the breach of the peace conviction of 187 African American civil
rights demonstrators who were marching and singing in Columbia, South
Carolina.63  The police, fearing impending violence by an aggressively hostile
audience, threatened the demonstrators with arrest if they did not disperse,
and the arrest, trial, and conviction of the demonstrators followed their
refusal to obey the police demand.64  For Justice Stewart, this case was “a far
cry from the situation in Feiner,”65 and seemed to him to involve “no more
than that the opinions which they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently
opposed to the views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and
necessitate police protection.”66  Quoting Terminiello, Stewart concluded that
criminal convictions of the speakers would be permitted only if there was a
“clear and present danger . . . ris[ing] far above public inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or unrest.”67
Facts similar to those in Edwards were presented in Cox v. Louisiana,
where again the leader of a civil rights demonstration, the Reverend B. Elton
Cox, was arrested for, inter alia, disturbing the peace in Baton Rouge, Louisi-
ana.68  As a result of his arrest, Cox was sentenced to a cumulative one year
and nine months in jail for leading a group of about two thousand singing,
cheering, and clapping demonstrators.69  In response to the city’s claim that
action was taken against the demonstration because “violence was about to
erupt,”70 Justice Goldberg again distinguished Feiner, pointing out that no
actual violence had ensued, that the presence of local and state police
appeared sufficient to prevent any violence, and that “constitutional rights
may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exer-
62 The law on the power of the police to move or remove people is largely to the effect
that the greater includes the lesser, and thus that if the police may lawfully arrest someone
then they may lawfully remove them without arrest. See Rachel Harmon, Lawful Orders
and Police Use of Force (Sept. 29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
But an important question, and one that the doctrine neither answers nor even addresses,
is whether the First Amendment might require attempted removal prior to arrest, a
requirement that does not exist outside of the First Amendment context.
63 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
64 Id. at 233.
65 Id. at 236.
66 Id. at 237.
67 Id. (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
68 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
69 Id. at 538–39.
70 Id. at 550.
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cise.”71  And thus by the time similar facts were once again presented in
1969, in a case involving a Chicago antiwar demonstration led by the come-
dian and civil rights activist Dick Gregory,72 Chief Justice Warren was able to
begin his majority opinion, an opinion that followed Edwards and Cox in all
material respects, with the observation that “[t]his is a simple case.”73
Although some might suspect that the results in Edwards, Cox, and Greg-
ory were heavily influenced by the Warren Court’s sympathy with the civil
rights demonstrators and the causes they were espousing,74 that conclusion is
belied75 by subsequent developments, most directly the Supreme Court’s
1992 decision in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement.76  Here, the demon-
strators were members of a white supremacist organization who proposed to
conduct a demonstration in opposition to the federal holiday commemorat-
ing the birth of Martin Luther King, Jr.77  But because the county sought to
impose a fee for the demonstration permit under a county ordinance
allowing the amount of the fee to vary with the expected costs of law enforce-
ment for the particular demonstration, the demonstrators refused to pay the
fee and instead challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.78
Much of Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion dealt with the question
whether a facial challenge was appropriate in this case,79 but the most impor-
tant aspect of Forsyth County for present purposes is the Court’s conclusion
that imposing a fee based on the expected costs of police protection and
other security was a form of impermissible content regulation, given that the
amount of security required would plainly vary with the content of the
71 Id. at 551 (quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963)).
72 Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
73 Id. at 111.
74 Cf. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (documenting
First Amendment decisions that arose in the context of 1960s civil rights issues).
75 The statement in the text is perhaps too quick.  Actually, there are four possibilities.
One is that a subsequent willingness to protect morally undesirable demonstrators even in
the face of a hostile audience, as in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123
(1992), is indeed evidence that the results in Edwards, Cox, and Gregory had little or noth-
ing to do with sympathy to the demonstrators and their cause.  Second is that a change in
the membership of the Court (only Justices Brennan and White sat for both Gregory and
Forsyth County) makes any generalization across the relevant time period impossible.  Third
is that stare decisis really does matter for some issues at some times on the Supreme Court,
making Cox, Edwards, and Gregory potentially causally influential of the Forsyth County out-
come. See Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 381 (2007).  And fourth is that the identity of the demonstrators genuinely
made a difference, given that the ordinance under attack in Forsyth County was enacted not
in response to the kind of white supremacist parades at issue in that case itself, but against
the background of some number of recent African American civil rights demonstrations in
Forsyth County, an overwhelmingly white and undeniably hostile place.
76 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
77 Id. at 127.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 129–36.
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speech.80  And although Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas,81 the thrust of his dissent was that no such con-
tent-based fee had been imposed in this case, or even in previous demonstra-
tions under the ordinance.  As a result, we cannot know how the dissenters
would have voted had such a fee been imposed here, but it is at least plausi-
ble to speculate that in 1992 all nine members of the Supreme Court
believed it a violation of the First Amendment to impose upon demonstrators
the cost of police protection and related security to control a hostile audi-
ence whose hostility was in response to the content of an otherwise constitu-
tionally protected speech, protest, march, demonstration, parade, or rally.
On the surface, it thus appears that we now have a considerable amount
of law on the problem of the hostile audience, a body of doctrine going back
at least to the 1930s and continuing through a collection of modern lower
court cases applying what seems to be Supreme Court doctrine through For-
syth County.82  But appearances can be deceiving.  In a number of important
respects, the doctrine leaves substantial and increasingly salient questions
unanswered.  For example, many of the Supreme Court decisions described
above rely heavily or at times almost exclusively on the vagueness of the rele-
vant governing standards,83 and thus on the consequent worry that such
vagueness will allow excess official discretion, a discretion that would create
an undue risk of impermissible content-based (and especially viewpoint-
80 Id. at 137.  In a controversial line of “secondary effects” cases, the Supreme Court
has held that secondary effects indirectly caused by the content of speech might be regu-
lated without violating the prohibition on content regulation.  Most of those cases have
involved zoning and related restrictions on “adult” establishments, where the justification
for the regulation was the effect on the neighborhood of such establishments in terms of
crime, property value, viability of retail trade, and general quality of life. See City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  For subsequent applications, discussions,
and criticism of the secondary effects idea, see City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,
535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Charles H. Clarke, Freedom of Speech and the Problem of the
Lawful Harmful Public Reaction: Adult Use Cases of Renton and Mini Theatres, 20 AKRON L.
REV. 187 (1986); Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to Anthropomorphic Cows: Communi-
cative Manner and the First Amendment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1339 (2002); Philip J. Prygoski, The
Supreme Court’s “Secondary Effects” Analysis in Free Speech Cases, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1989);
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135 (2003);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987); Note, The Con-
tent Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (1989). But if the
secondary effects approach is not to be limited to restrictions on places of adult entertain-
ment, the tension between that approach and Forsyth County (and Terminiello, as noted by
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Renton, 475 U.S. at 59 (Brennan, J., dissenting)), where an
analogous secondary effect was deemed to be content based, is inescapable.
81 Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 137 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
82 See Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228 (6th Cir. 2015) (extensively ana-
lyzing the doctrine); see also Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v.
District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d
899 (6th Cir. 1975); Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1973).
83 E.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236–38 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 307–08 (1940).
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based) discrimination against demonstrators with views opposed to those of
the officials making the decisions.84  But a vagueness determination is often
for a court the path of least resistance, allowing courts to skirt the direct
question of which kinds of nonvague restrictions are permissible and which
are not.85  As a consequence, we know less than we might—here and else-
where—about just what kinds of specific, nonvague standards would be per-
missible, or just how specific the standard must be to avoid invalidation on
vagueness grounds.
Other “holes” in the existing doctrine are equally apparent.  We know
from Cantwell, Terminiello, and the above-described cases from the 1960s that
law enforcement cannot too quickly control an actually or dangerous situa-
tion by restricting or arresting the speaker whose words have launched the
dangerous situation, and we know that police are required to take all reason-
able steps before resorting to speaker control, but we know very little about
what is to count as reasonable, what degree of deployment a police depart-
ment is required to use, and the extent to which a local police department is
required by the First Amendment to call upon county law enforcement, state
law enforcement, or state military (i.e., the National Guard) forces before
taking action against the speaker.  Indeed, the problem is especially apparent
in places like Skokie and Charlottesville, where a police force of a size nor-
mally sufficient to deal with law enforcement problems of a small city must
confront a law enforcement issue of far greater magnitude, involving far
more people than would typically congregate in a smallish community.
Relatedly, if law enforcement fails to protect the speaker, then what state
and federal remedies, if any, are available on behalf of the speaker against
the relevant officials and the relevant agencies?  Can speakers compel the
allocation of law enforcement resources beyond the jurisdiction of those offi-
cially employed by that jurisdiction?  If so, can they compel the county or the
state within which a municipality is located to take action?  And so on.  What
follows is an attempt to explore these and the various other questions that
are now arising in the context of an increasing number of increasingly hostile
confrontations between speakers and those who would protest and demon-
strate against them.
84 For sources illustrative of First Amendment vagueness, see generally Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S.
676 (1968); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vague-
ness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137 (2016); Peter W. Low & Joel S. Johnson, Changing the
Vocabulary of the Vagueness Doctrine, 101 VA. L. REV. 2051 (2015); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
85 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 177–83 (1962); Melvyn R. Durchslag, The Inevitability (and Desirability?)
of Avoidance: A Response to Dean Kloppenburg, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2006).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-4\NDL406.txt unknown Seq: 14 29-MAY-19 15:33
1684 notre dame law review [vol. 94:4
III. HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
As contemporary events make clear, the most common problem (or at
least the problem focused on in this Article) flowing from demonstrations,
rallies, and even individual inflammatory speakers is rarely that speakers will
urge their listeners to take unlawful actions against third parties, as was the
case in Brandenburg v. Ohio.86  Nor is it that listeners may be offended, dis-
gusted, or shocked, as in Cohen v. California,87 although that is surely often
the case.  Rather, it is that offended, shocked, disgusted, angry, or strongly
disagreeing listeners (or viewers) will threaten to take, or will actually take,
violent action against the initial speakers and that disorder will ensue, as was
the case in the decisions described above, and as would probably have
occurred had the Nazis actually marched in Skokie.88  Often the accounts of
such events are unclear and conflicting, and as a result it is probably wise to
include in the analysis those situations in which audience reactions eventually
lead to violence and disorder, even though it is sometimes unclear exactly
who, literally or figuratively, threw the first punch.  Still, the basic idea is that
a speaker’s words or images are sometimes viewed as highly controversial,
offensive, or harmful by some portion of an audience, and that genuine phys-
ical violence or the imminent threat of it ensues.
One thing that is now settled, if anything is settled, and that the above-
described post-Feiner cases make reasonably clear,89 is that in such cases law
enforcement may not initially or prematurely arrest the speaker.  It also
appears settled from the same line of cases that the state may not prosecute
on grounds of incitement the speakers whose speech has prompted the reac-
tions.  To do so would create what we now call the “heckler’s veto,”90 in
which those who would protest against a speech have, in effect, the right to
stop the speaker from speaking.  And it is probably settled as well that even if
getting the speaker to stop speaking would be genuinely necessary to prevent
violence, punitive actions against the speaker may not take place until after
the speaker has been given the opportunity to leave the venue on his or her
86 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).  And so too with the earlier cases in the Ameri-
can free speech canon, all of which involved speakers (or writers) who encouraged others
to resist conscription or contribute to the overthrow of the government. E.g., Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
87 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
88 Sometimes the violence ensues when counterprotesters provoke, in the “fighting
words” sense of “provoke.”  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Good-
ing v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (narrowing the scope of the “fighting words” excep-
tion); see also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,
408 U.S. 901 (1972) (violent retaliatory reactions from the protesters).
89 See supra notes 63–82 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, supra note 11.
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own, and perhaps, absent the speaker’s willingness to depart, there has been
an attempt at a nonpunitive removal of the speaker.91
But although this much seems more or less clear, what is importantly not
clear is just how much the authorities must do before taking some sort of
action against the speaker or before bringing the entire event to a halt.92  In
some past cases, as in the civil rights demonstration cases described above,93
the authorities have done very little, perhaps because the police had greater
sympathy with the objectors than with the initial speaker.  And in Charlottes-
ville in August 2017, where there had been no credible suggestions of police
sympathy with the white supremacist protesters, the police likely under-
reacted in part out of fear of the consequences of overreaction.94  But even
assuming total good faith and the best intentions and efforts on the part of a
municipality, how much must that municipality do?  Must it deploy all or
most of its police force, even if doing so would create other dangers to safety
and security?95  Must it call on nonlocal law enforcement authorities, such as
county police, state police, or even the National Guard?
91 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
92 For the Virginia unlawful assembly law, which was used in Charlottesville, see VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-411 (West 2018).  The earlier cases conclude that “clear and present
danger” is the appropriate standard, see Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237
(1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 308, 311 (1940), but those cases precede the reformulation of “clear and present
danger” in Brandenburg. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
93 See supra notes 63–82 and accompanying text.
94 See HUNTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 153–65.  Not surprisingly, the massive law
enforcement presence in Charlottesville on August 12, 2018, when large numbers of
counterprotesters (and essentially no white supremacists or their allies) commemorated
the one-year anniversary of the events of a year earlier, generated complaints about there
being too much police restriction, despite the fact that the events of August 11 and 12,
2018, produced essentially no injuries and no arrests. See Tyler Hammel, Charlottesville




95 Several days before the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville on August 12, 2017,
the Charlottesville Police requested the Albemarle County Police (whose jurisdiction does
not include the City of Charlottesville) and the University of Virginia Police (whose juris-
diction does not extend beyond the University) to take all of the Charlottesville Police
Department’s 911 calls.  The City made this request because it knew that its security
responsibilities for the Unite the Right rally would preclude being able to take or respond
to the normal array of 911 calls.  The requested departments agreed to this request,
although of course they were not required to do so. See Lisa Provence, Police Expect
Thousands, Closed Streets Downtown August 12, C-VILLE WKLY. (Aug. 10, 2017), www.c-ville
.com/police-expect-thousands-closed-streets-downtown-august-12.  If the requests had been
refused, the costs to general security occasioned by providing security to the Unite the
Right demonstrators would have been even more obvious.  And even with the requests for
assistance in taking 911 calls having been granted, was there less county and university
security than there otherwise would have been because the county and university security
forces had taken on additional responsibilities without additional staffing or funding?
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We now know that these problems come with real numbers and real
dollars attached to them.  The University of California at Berkeley estimates
that it cost in the vicinity of four million dollars to provide law enforcement
and related services for the actual or planned speeches by only three individ-
uals—Ann Coulter, Ben Shapiro, and Milo Yiannopoulos—in only one
month.96  The City of Charlottesville spent nearly seventy thousand dollars
on the August 12, 2017, “Unite the Right” rally97 and, earlier, thirty thousand
dollars on extra police and other services for a July 8 march by the Ku Klux
Klan, and additional costs were incurred by county and state police, the Uni-
versity of Virginia, and other official bodies.98  The University of Florida
incurred security costs of five hundred thousand dollars in connection with a
lecture by white supremacist Richard Spencer.99  And when a small number
of the white supremacists who initiated the Charlottesville events of 2017
gathered in the District of Columbia a year later to celebrate the anniversary
of the earlier event and were met with thousands of counterprotesters, the
96 See UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, REPORT OF THE CHANCELLOR’S COMMISSION ON FREE
SPEECH (2018), https://chancellor.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/report_of_the_com
mission_on_free_speech.pdf.  For various media reports with slightly varying numbers, see
Jocelyn Gecker, The Cost of Free Speech Isn’t Cheap at UC Berkeley, AP NEWS (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.apnews.com/f2d6a139cd6b44d7a743932f2b913677; Chris Quintana, Berkeley’s
Leader Saw Hints that ‘Free Speech Week’ Was a Stunt. Here’s Why She Planned for It Anyway.,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Berkeley-s-
Leader-Saw-Hints/241299; Elise Ulwelling, Ben Shapiro’s Visit Cost UC Berkeley an Estimated
$600K for Security, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Sept. 18, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/
17/uc-berkeley-security-costs-ben-shapiros-visit-estimated-600k/.
97 Andrew Blake, ‘Unite the Right’ Rally Costs City $70K in Security: Charlottesville Police
Dept., WASH. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/sep/
26/charlottesville-police-place-70k-price-tag-unite-r/.
98 See Dean Seal, CPD, VSP Tally Costs for KK Rally: City Spent $35k, VSP Minimized
Trooper Overtime, DAILY PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.dailyprogress.com/news/
local/cpd-vsp-tally-costs-for-kkk-rally-city-spent-k/article_ea31c9b0-7790-11e7-82bc-
333e7f750dd7.html; see also Blake, supra note 97. In addition, the University of Virginia
itself spent another sixty-three thousand dollars on law enforcement for the August 11
white supremacist rally, a rally coordinated with the Unite the Right rally a day later. See
Ruth Serven, UVa Spent $63,000 on Response to August Rallies, DAILY PROGRESS (Sept. 27,
2017), https://www.dailyprogress.com/news/uva-spent-on-response-to-august-rallies/arti-
cle_75a1cf38-a3ea-11e7-b66f-ab5b5925c684.html.  Subsequent reporting and accounting
produced a total of five hundred fourty thousand dollars in combined costs for the City of
Charlottesville, the County of Albemarle, and the University of Virginia for the July 8,
August 11, and August 12 events, although this figure also includes costs (such as six thou-
sand dollars to place a shroud over the statute of Robert E. Lee) not directly attributable to
any of the rallies, demonstrators, protests, or counterprotests. See Chris Suarez & Allison
Wrabel, Charlottesville Rally Costs Top Half a Million Dollars, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.roanoke.com/news/virginia/charlottesville-rally-costs-top-half-a-million-dol-
lars/article_aa5d7c2a-2440-5d35-a0cb-c0c6188202ef.html.
99 Claire McNeill, UF Security Costs Top $500,000 for Richard Spencer’s Talk on White ‘Sepa-
ration,’ TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/
college/uf-security-costs-top-500000-for-richard-spencers-talk-on-white-separation/23406
89.
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security expense incurred by the District for this one event exceeded two
million dollars.100
It might once have been thought that claims about the expense of pro-
viding protection for speakers likely to cause101 a violent confrontation with a
hostile audience were prone to be exaggerated by state and local officials
eager to prevent the speech in the first place, but today such suspicions rest
on a flimsier basis.  Now, with the benefit of real events and real numbers, we
can understand that officials worried about costs as well as about danger will
be concerned that every dollar spent on protecting unpopular or even hate-
ful speakers will be a dollar unavailable for seemingly—at least to them—
more worthy purposes.102
The question of “how much?” involves a complex intersection of finan-
cial, logistical, personnel, jurisdictional, and, of course, philosophical consid-
erations.103  In the typical hostile audience scenario these days, the size of
the hostile audience is substantially greater than the size of the group of “pri-
mary” speakers.104  And often, as was certainly the case in Charlottesville, the
100 See Fenit Nirappil, White-Supremacist Rally Cost D.C. at Least $2.6 Million, Preliminary
Estimate Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-
politics/white-supremacist-rally-cost-dc-26-million-preliminary-estimate-shows/2018/08/
14/3edebcce-9ffa-11e8-83d2-70203b8d7b44_story.html?utm_term=.5759063ce1f0.
101 The attribution of causation here is tricky.  In the “but for” language of American
tort law, we can say that the violent confrontation in Charlottesville on August 12 was the
“but for” consequence of the march by the Unite the Right demonstrators.  The violence
was also, however, the “but for” consequence of the existence of so-called counterprotes-
tors, and it may have been the “but for” consequence of the size and nature of the police
presence.  Attributions of causation under circumstances of multiple causation are often
(and perhaps necessarily) morally loaded, however, such that people may be hesitant to
attribute the causation of unpleasant consequences to those whose actions we deem mor-
ally desirable, and, conversely, prone to attribute causation for such consequences to those
we are willing to condemn morally. See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992).  On the relationship between moral attribution and other
factors people use to attribute causality, see Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon,
The Relationship Between Counterfactual (“But For”) and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings
and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001).  And thus
although both the Charlottesville white supremacist protestors and the politically left
counterprotestors were each the “but for” causes of the events that ensued, the subsequent
discourse has tended to assign causal responsibility largely to the white supremacists, the
constitutional (and not moral) equivalency of their status notwithstanding.
102 See Macklin W. Thornton, Comment, Laying Siege to the Ivory Tower: Resource Alloca-
tion in Response to the Heckler’s Veto on University Campuses, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 722–27
(2018).
103 Cf. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (discussing costs of rights protections generally).
104 The labels are complex. See supra note 7.  It is common to refer nowadays to the
initial speakers as “protesters” because they are often protesting what they see as a govern-
ment excessively sympathetic to the claims of racial and religious minorities, and then to
refer to the audience as the “counterprotesters.”  But there is no reason to think that the
scenarios are necessarily so limited, and we can imagine events in which a hostile audience
is challenging a speaker or group of speakers who are not protesting anything.
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size of the hostile audience dwarfs the size of the local police force.  In such
cases, local law enforcement appears to have a series of choices, and it may be
useful to explore several of the alternatives.
One possibility, when faced with the prospect of a large and potentially
violent counterdemonstration, is simply for local law enforcement to do the
best it can with its existing resources and personnel.  If violence then breaks
out during the event, or is about to break out imminently, the police could
then, but not earlier, use whatever local mechanisms are available—in Char-
lottesville it was the declaration of an “unlawful assembly”105—to bring the
event to a halt, and then use law enforcement to restrict or apprehend those
who did not obey lawful orders to disperse.  Assuming that the restriction and
apprehension did not selectively single out the initial speaker (or speaking
group) for apprehension or restriction, and assuming that anticipatory
restriction requires genuine immediate prospects of violence, there appears
to be no First Amendment problem with such an approach.  The police do,
after all, break up fights all the time, especially ones that break out in bars
after angry words are spoken, and no one has ever even suggested that this
creates a First Amendment problem, even if, as is so often the case, the fight
was ignited by an exchange of what would be, in other contexts, constitution-
ally protected speech.
For admirable reasons, however, law enforcement officials would gener-
ally prefer preventing fights to breaking them up, and here is where matters
become more difficult.  Assuming, realistically, that law enforcement antici-
pates disorder prior to some event, and assuming, more and more realisti-
cally these days, that local law enforcement believes it is unlikely to be able
with existing personnel and resources to control the violence once it erupts,
what should the police do?  What must it do?  As we know from the cases
described above, law enforcement cannot simply sanction the speaker or
refuse to grant a permit or otherwise refuse to allow the event to take
place.106  And as we know from actual events, local law enforcement will typi-
cally request support from regional and state law enforcement, and such
requests are commonly granted if reasonable, thus making extrajurisdictional
105 HUNTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 182.  See id. at 205–06 on the use of VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-406, 18.2-407 (West 2018).  On the interaction between such statutes and the
First Amendment, see United Steelworkers v. Dalton, 544 F. Supp. 291, 293 (E.D. Va.
1982).
106 Indeed, the previous version of the Virginia unlawful assembly statute had been
invalidated for failure to incorporate a “clear and present danger” standard. See Owens v.
Commonwealth, 179 S.E.2d 477 (Va. 1971).  Perhaps chastened by earlier invalidations of
viewpoint-based speaker restrictions, e.g., Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No.
3:17CV00056, 2017 WL 3474071 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2017); Draego v. City of Charlottes-
ville, No. 3:16-CV-00057, 2016 WL 6834025 (W.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2016), Charlottesville
granted no permits to anyone for demonstrations marking the one-year anniversary of the
events of August 12, 2017.  The permit refusals produced no court challenges, and so the
question remains open whether the events of a year earlier would have satisfied the clear
and present danger tests of earlier Supreme Court cases.
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support commonly available.107  But the costs of that extrajurisdictional or
cross-jurisdictional support are considerable, and at some point, although we
do not know at what point, a city, county, or state will simply not have the
available personnel and not have the available funds.  When this point is
reached, can a city then deny a permit, or otherwise prohibit the event?  And
assuming that such decisions will eventually come before the courts, can a
city or a county or a state argue that providing more than some amount will
then take funds away from school lunches?  From emergency medical ser-
vices?  From public housing?  From low-income welfare assistance?  From
providing services that themselves have a constitutional aspect, such as pro-
viding a certain quality of unpaid legal assistance for defendants in criminal
cases,108 or, in earlier times, providing police protection for African Ameri-
can children seeking to attend previously segregated schools?109  Now that
we know the actual costs involved in places such as Berkeley, Charlottesville,
Gainesville, and the District of Columbia, we cannot avoid confronting the
fact that protecting speakers exercising their First Amendment rights will
come at some cost to other worthy municipal goals, including, at times, pro-
tecting or enforcing other constitutional rights.110
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that more extreme speakers
are likely to require more protection from hostile audiences.  And thus, per-
haps perversely, the more extreme a group’s views are, the greater will be its
ability to call upon public resources for its protection, and the greater the
amount of the resources it will require for its protection.  And thus, even
more ironically or perversely, it may turn out that difficult questions of alloca-
tion of state and local resources are being made not by legislatures, and not
by courts, but by those who are least representative of the public, which is
ultimately supplying the resources.111
Alternatively, law enforcement might at some point simply say to pro-
spective demonstrators that it can provide only so much protection, and that
any injuries caused by disruption beyond the ability of the police to control
the audience will simply have to be borne by those who have suffered them.
But although local police may on occasion stand back and let a small number
of combatants in a bar fight simply fight it out, such an approach seems mor-
ally, politically, and perhaps constitutionally unacceptable both for bar fights
107 HUNTON & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 101; see also supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
108 Although the right to appointed counsel in (most) criminal cases has been guaran-
teed since 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963), the quality of representa-
tion above a minimal standard of competence is largely a matter of governmental
discretion.  On these issues, see Peter A. Joy, Rationing Justice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 205 (2011).
109 For accounts of various episodes, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW:
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961 (1994).
110 For a prescient discussion of many of the issues, see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 336–42 (1970).
111 I am grateful to David Pozen for valuable insights on this point.
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and for larger events.112  And as long as that is so, then there is no avoiding
the problem occasioned by the fact that providing security for the exercise of
First Amendment rights will draw resources away from other uses.113
Faced with this inevitability, the entity responsible for the additional
costs might attempt to pass the costs onto others.  The Universities of Califor-
nia, Florida, and Virginia could raise tuition, presumably following the lead
of the car rental companies and the airlines with their fuel price fees by call-
ing the tuition increase a “First Amendment security fee” or something of
that variety.  But of course universities operate in competitive and price-elas-
tic markets,114 and thus attempting to pass costs on to students—or on to
faculty by cutting salaries, for example, or on to a university’s fan base by
reducing the number of football and basketball scholarships—will involve
other sacrifices.115  So too with cities and towns, especially ones that seek to
attract business by offering lower taxes or special tax breaks or rebates.  Here
again, the incentives are almost all in the direction of cities and towns
attempting to reduce the costs of what the courts have said they must do in
the name of the First Amendment, and as long as it remains generally consti-
tutionally impermissible for federal courts to order state and local govern-
ments to raise taxes,116 the problem appears to be ever more intractable.
Although the problems seem beyond easy solution, it is a mistake to
assume that such problems have not been identified previously and in other
contexts.  Most obviously, the issue of constitutionally mandated and poten-
tially unpopular allocations and reallocations of scarce resources has been
112 On the lack of a constitutional claim against public authorities who do not act
against violence, see, albeit in a very different context, DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (denying constitutional claim based on state’s failure to
provide protection against violence).  For the argument that DeShaney and police inaction
in the face of impending violence are conceptually similar, see Barbara E. Armacost,
Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 982, 984
(1996); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. CT.
REV. 53.
113 The problem, of course, is not unique to the First Amendment, and arises whenever
rights have costs (which they usually do). See Katharine G. Young, Rights and Queues: On
Distributive Contests in the Modern State, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 65 (2016).
114 Such genuine competition and price elasticity may be less present for major univer-
sities than for major car rental companies and major airlines, and thus as an empirical
matter what in antitrust law is called “conscious parallelism,” Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Para-
mount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954), may exist less often in the market for
higher education.
115 Such sacrifices, ironically, may produce further demonstrations, which might then
produce further counterdemonstrations.  For example, University of California at Berkeley
students are inclined toward public protest in the face of proposed tuition increases, and
so an attempt to pass along the costs of demonstrations to students is likely to do little
other than encourage more demonstrations. See Francesca Munsayac, UC Berkeley Students
Rally Against University Tuition Hikes, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.daily-
cal.org/2018/01/24/uc-berkeley-students-rally-university-tuition-hikes/.
116 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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widely discussed in the context of judicially enforced social welfare rights.117
Such rights—typically to housing, education, welfare, health care, and pen-
sions—are not much part of the American constitutional landscape, but do
have a larger presence elsewhere.  And thus when the Constitutional Court of
South Africa mandates greater governmental expenditures on housing,118 is
it forcing the South African Parliament to allocate scarce resources among,
say, housing, education, food, and health, in a way other than that which
would have been chosen by Parliament?  And when the same court mandates
the provision of antiretrovirals to those suffering from AIDS, is it taking
resources away from those suffering from other illnesses?119  This is not the
place to replay the many debates that already exist on the subject,120 but it is
a reminder that the constitutionalization of an interest will produce resource
reallocations, and when constitutionalization is accompanied by judicial
enforcement, what is then produced is a judicial determination of social
resource allocations.
The issue of judicial determinations of governmental priorities among
worthy goals is obvious with respect to positive social welfare rights, but exists
as well with most other rights.  The issue most clearly exists with respect to
those constitutional rights that actually do require affirmative government
expenditures, as with the right to counsel.121  But even rights that do not
seem so obviously to require expenditures—so-called negative rights, such as
the rights of freedom of speech and press—are still indirectly costly, in the
sense that by imposing limits on what the state—in its own unconstrained
wisdom—might decide to do as a matter of policy, the existence and enforce-
ment of a negative right is itself a cost.122  But although when and how this is
so deserves further analysis, for our purposes here the clearer and thus better
analogy is simply to the example of positive social welfare rights.  And thus
the normative question is about the way in which requiring protection for
117 See generally MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008); KATHARINE G.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (2012).
118 Gov’t of the Republic v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).  Perhaps recognizing
the difficult allocational problems involved in mandating concrete housing expenditures,
the Constitutional Court refused to specify minimum expenditures, requiring only that
governmental determinations of housing expenditures be reasonable. Id. at 66.
119 See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
120 See supra note 117.
121 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  Such concerns about resource
allocation might conceivably have been behind subsequent decisions setting both the
nature and the limitations of what the state is required to provide. Compare Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeals), with Mayer
v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (right to state-provided transcript).
122 See Frederick Schauer, Constitutionalism and Coercion, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1881 (2013);
Frederick Schauer, The Annoying Constitution: Implications for the Allocation of Interpretive
Authority, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1689 (2017).  For an impatient critique of the common
tendency to engage in counterfactual (or at least contested) empirical assumptions as a
way of avoiding confronting the costs of rights, see Frederick Schauer, Rights, Constitutions
and the Perils of Panglossianism, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 635 (2018).
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those who would exercise their First Amendment rights requires the state to
spend more than it would have spent had it possessed the ability simply to
prohibit the speech, and requires the state—or other governmental entity—
either to secure additional resources for such a purpose or to reallocate
resources toward the First Amendment and away from other potentially wor-
thy goals.  Moreover, as noted above, the problem is not that the reallocation
is at the direction of a less-popularly responsive court.  There is no reason
here to replay several generations of angst about the so-called countermajori-
tarian difficulty.123  Rather, the point is only that a First Amendment–driven
reallocation of governmental resources turns out to be substantially in the
control of the speaking groups themselves, and so the greater the provoca-
tion, the greater the reallocation.  Provocative speakers have the ability to
capitalize on this phenomenon by forcing the state to spend money for their
protection, money that might otherwise be spent in ways of which the provoc-
ative speaker disapproves.  And hostile audiences themselves have the ability
to prevent the reallocation by keeping their hostility nonviolent, or non-
provocative of speaker retaliation.  But whether and when this will in fact
happen is anyone’s guess.
At least some of the problem of the hostile audience, and the problem
of the resource reallocation it occasions, appears to be fueled by the reluc-
tance of officials to impose very much in the way of serious penalties when
actual violence breaks out at a rally or demonstration.  The causes for this
reluctance are multiple.  Some of the reluctance might stem from a general
unwillingness of law enforcement to employ arrest and prosecution as a rem-
edy for street disturbances, regardless of their nature.  Some might be attrib-
utable to law enforcement sympathy with counterprotesters and hostility to
the protesters whose words and symbols have caused outrage in others.  And
some might arise out of the difficulty in identifying actual perpetrators under
circumstances in which angry words and then angry gestures and then physi-
cal contact appear to come from both sides.124  But whatever the cause, it is
impossible completely to discount the possibility that the actual or impend-
ing violence that creates the need for massive and expensive law enforcement
presence is not completely unrelated to the fact that for many members of a
hostile audience the initiation of physical contact, often by the throwing of
various projectiles or by the wielding of sticks and poles, seems to them to be
a relatively risk-free act.  And thus, perhaps again ironically, a hostile audi-
ence may at times draw resources away from their use on governmental goals
of which the members of a hostile audience might very well approve.
123 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 85, at 16–20; ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE
CONSTITUTION 55–58 (2011); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:
The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
124 On the larger problem of applying traditional free speech principles and doctrines
to the presence of multiple voices, sometimes attempting to speak simultaneously, see R.
George Wright, Public Fora and the Problem of Too Much Speech, 106 KY. L.J. 409 (2017–2018).
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IV. ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES—LEGAL AND OTHERWISE—
OF THE HOSTILE AUDIENCE
Although actual physical violence has, tragically, ensued from rallies and
demonstrations in Charlottesville and elsewhere, far more often a hostile
audience manifests its hostility in non–physically violent ways.  Sometimes
such tactics include blocking speakers’ access to the designated location for
the demonstration, as happened in Charlottesville when a group of religious
leaders locked arms in an attempt to block the white supremacists from
reaching the park where the rally was to occur.125
This kind of blocking does not appear to raise important conceptual or
theoretical issues.  Such blocking or obstructing is typically unlawful,126 and
the reluctance to sanction the blockers is often likely a combination of law
enforcement sympathy for their cause and law enforcement fear of embar-
rassing publicity, especially in an age when everything is photographed by
someone with a smartphone, if the blockers must be carried away or other-
wise physically removed.  But there is little doubt that such blocking activity is
ordinarily unlawful under statutes or common-law principles dealing with the
obstruction of free passage,127 and we would scarcely hesitate before con-
cluding that the police and the legal system may intervene to sanction those
who would keep people from getting to their home, to their place of busi-
ness, or even to the bus stop.  And there is even less doubt that the police
may not constitutionally respond to the blocking by sanctioning or moving
the speakers rather than the blockers.  If the speakers are prevented by
others from getting to where they have a legal and constitutional right to be,
the remedy cannot, at least in theory, and at least under the post-Feiner hos-
tile audience cases discussed above, be to tell the speakers that they must go
elsewhere.
There remains an interesting question, however, as to what private reme-
dies are available against those who would obstruct others in the exercise of
constitutional rights.  If the obstruction of a speaker constitutionally entitled
to speak is physical, presumably an injunction against the obstructer would
be available, but the typical demonstration scenario provides little notice in
advance and involves time periods that are shorter than the ability of formal
legal processes to respond to them.  Still, there might also be after-the-fact
common-law remedies that might, depending on the circumstances, under-
gird an action for false imprisonment,128 for obstructing free passage,129 for
125 See Bo Erickson, Religious Leaders Criticize Police Response in Charlottesville, Virginia,
CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/charlottesville-virginia-car-attack-religious-
leaders-criticize-police/ (last updated Aug. 13, 2017).
126 See, e.g., Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing Maine
statute prohibiting the obstruction of public ways and the obstruction of free passage).
127 See Marcavage v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding arrest of
political protesters under obstruction of free passage ordinance).
128 On the tort of false imprisonment, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 42 (AM.
LAW INST. 1965); William L. Prosser, False Imprisonment: Consciousness of Confinement, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1955).
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assault, for creating a public nuisance,130 or possibly for interference with
advantageous relations,131 even though any of these,132 in most circum-
stances, would be somewhat of a stretch as a matter of tort law.  Perhaps more
plausible would be some variety of civil rights action, given that the blockers
are interfering with the exercise of a constitutional right.  And here it
appears that the most likely civil rights action would be based, ironically, on
§ 1985(3) of Title 42 of the United States Code,133 which creates a private
cause of action against those who would conspire to deprive others of their
civil rights.  The problem, however, is that § 1985(3) does not on its face
apply to those who would deprive others of all or any of their civil rights, but
only to those who would conspire to deprive others of the “equal protection
of the laws,” or of their “equal privileges and immunities under the laws.”134
And so although the latter phrase might be argued to apply to interference
with the exercise of free speech rights, especially if we conveniently ignore
the repetition of the word “equal,” the far more likely textual conclusion, and
one supported by the cases, is that neither § 1985(3) nor any other federal
statute makes it a crime, or creates a private cause of action, for private per-
sons to interfere with the free speech rights of others.135
This does not mean, of course, that a community could not enact an
ordinance prohibiting such interference, or that a police officer might not
issue a lawful order to counterprotesters to stop interfering, the disobedience
with which would constitute the independent offense of disobedience of a
lawful order of a police officer.  And so although some number of universi-
ties have rules forbidding students from interfering with speakers at public
university events,136 there do not appear to be parallel state or local laws that
specifically make interference with the exercise of free speech rights unlaw-
ful.  At the present time, therefore, those who would wish for sanctions
129 See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
130 On actionable creation of a public nuisance as encompassing obstructing free pas-
sage, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479, 3480 (West 2018).
131 The typical “interference with advantageous relations” tort action is premised on
interference with commercial, economic, or contractual relations. See Shawsheen River
Estates Assocs. v. Herman, No. 95-1557, 1995 WL 809834 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 1995).
There does not appear to be a reported decision applying such a cause of action to inter-
ference with the exercise of a constitutional right.
132 My colleague Leslie Kendrick, a teacher and scholar of both the First Amendment
and torts, refers to these as the “back of the book” torts, a characterization that says a great
deal about the frequency of their use.
133 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).  I say “ironically” because the statute was originally
enacted in 1871 as the Ku Klux Klan Act, designed to provide a cause of action against the
Klan, even though an action to interfere with the exercise of a constitutional right might,
in 2017, be brought by the Klan.  See Kevin E. Irwin, Note, The Reach of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3):
Sex Discrimination as a Gauge, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 331, 332–33 (1976).
134 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
135 See United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
136 See, e.g., Responding to Speaker Disruptions on Campus, COLUM. UNIV. (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://universitylife.columbia.edu/speaker-disruptions-on-campus.
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against interference must rely on what are likely to be understood as expan-
sive and unusual interpretations of existing criminal law or tort law.
The real problem, however, even assuming some sort of rule prohibiting
interference, is the definition of “interfere.”  We have to this point been con-
sidering only physical interference, where the application of various existing
criminal, civil, and regulatory laws might be at least plausible, but what of the
counterprotesters who bang on drums, engage in loud (and amplified with
bullhorns) yelling, or create deafening noises with Freon or vuvuzela horns?
The use of such aural obstruction is these days as common as it is effective,
but then the question arises as to whether there is (or should be) a remedy
for it.137  Presumably a venue might impose a content-neutral noise regula-
tion, along the lines of the regulation upheld for the public streets in Kovacs
v. Cooper,138 but such a regulation would be most plainly constitutional only if
it restricted the original speakers as well as those who are trying to keep them
from being heard.  The more difficult question is whether a content-neutral
restriction on those who would, with noise or signs or otherwise, interfere
with the lawful speech of a speaker can be sustained against the claim that
the objectors have no fewer free speech rights than does the original speaker.
We worry about the so-called heckler’s veto, but the First Amendment, after
all, presumably protects the hecklers as well as the hecklees.139
Although it is plain that hecklers do have free speech rights, the argu-
ment that they have rights to drown out other speakers seems strained.  As
long as reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions
are permissible, then it is at least plausible that some sort of first-come-first-
served or other regulations designed to ensure that speakers can at least be
heard would be permissible as well.140  In response, there might be the objec-
tion that such a regulation privileges those who get there first, or rewards
those who have the resources to secure a permit in advance, but such argu-
ments seem weak when compared to the argument for at least the reasona-
bleness of regulations that are aimed at making the right to free speech
effective, and restricting those who would make its exercise meaningless.141
137 Professor Emerson had little doubt that heckling that interferes with the ability of a
speaker to be heard “is the equivalent of sheer noise” and, in the context of protecting a
speaker against it, was equivalent to “physical force.” EMERSON, supra note 110, at 338.
138 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
139 See Mark Tushnet, What the Constitution Says Berkeley Can Do When Controversial Speak-
ers Come Knocking, VOX, https://vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/9/22/16346330/freespeech
(last updated Sept. 23, 2017); see also Mark Tushnet, Free Speech on Campus, BALKINIZATION
(Sept. 24, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/09/free-speech-on-campus.html.
140 See In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970) (in bank); SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH
MATTERS 126 (2014).
141 As I note in the Conclusion, the claim in the text is soundest if we see a free speech
regime as in some sense interactive, as most versions of the arguments based on searching
for truth or engaging in democratic decisionmaking and deliberation would maintain.  For
arguments based on searching for truth, see, for example United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
709, 727–28 (2012) (plurality opinion); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 93–94 (2d ed.
London, John W. Park & Son 1859); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Truth-Seeking Value,
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Even if restrictions on disruption or interference with speakers lawfully
entitled to speak when and where they are speaking are permissible, how-
ever, questions about what forms of behavior are to count as interference
persist, although they are as much questions of cognitive science as they are
of law.  Consider, for example, the experiences and reactions of many of us
when the person next to us at the theater, at a concert, or at the movies is
loudly chewing gum.  And what if, instead, those people were holding blocks
of limburger cheese?  Or pieces of dog poop?  Or nibbling on the carcass of
an uncooked dead bat?  These increasingly disgusting examples are designed
to suggest that interference need not come only when greater decibels are
produced by the audience than by the speakers, but also when there are any
of a large number of other behaviors that some would consider only mildly
annoying and easily ignored, but that others would find as obstructing of
their ability actually to hear and appreciate the speaker as are the distractions
caused by drums and loud horns.  Indeed, the same might be said about
visual distractions, and it is hard to imagine a pro-choice speaker not feeling
interfered with were a large number of audience members holding up signs
portraying aborted fetuses, or even jars containing aborted fetuses in
formaldehyde.142
39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 55 (2015); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the
Problem of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231 (2017).  For arguments based on engag-
ing in democratic decisionmaking and deliberation, see, for example, ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 8–78 (1965); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS
(1995); Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2016);
James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 CONST. COMMENT.
527 (2017).  On the other hand, if the arguments for a distinct right to free speech are
largely individualistic arguments based on self-expression or some conception of individual
autonomy, then it is less clear that assuring an environment in which speakers can be
understood is all that important.  For arguments based on self-expression, see, for exam-
ple, C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); SHIFFRIN, supra note
140; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST. COM-
MENT. 283 (2011); Susan H. Williams, Free Speech and Autonomy: Thinkers, Storytellers, and a
Systemic Approach to Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 399 (2011).  But for those of us who are
skeptical of the self-expression arguments, the purported right of a heckler to drown out a
speaker seems far less important, even though the self-expression or autonomy theorist
might come to a different conclusion.  For scholarship expressing skepticism of the self-
expression arguments, see, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ENQUIRY 47–72 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech on Tuesdays, 34 LAW & PHIL. 119
(2015); Frederick Schauer, On the Distinction Between Speech and Action, 65 EMORY L.J. 427
(2015).
142 There are also connections between the issues raised in this paragraph and the
concerns about silencing that have been prominently raised by the feminist anti-
pornography movement. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); see also RAE
LANGTON, SEXUAL SOLIPSISM (2009); SPEECH AND HARM (Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate
McGowan eds., 2012).  If the speech of one (or many) can effectively silence the speech of
another by changing the meaning or the force of what another says, as the theorists just
mentioned believe (correctly) it can, is such speech to count as an interference for legal
purposes?  And if it is not to count as interference for purposes of legal remedies, is it
nevertheless to count as interference for purposes of moral or political evaluation?  We
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The question of interference is thus not only the question of physical
interference, although such interferences appear to be the ones most amena-
ble to legal remedies.  It is also the question of which forms of nonphysical
interference should be sanctioned in some way, which forms should be
applauded, which forms should be encouraged, and which forms should be
condemned or discouraged.  But to answer those questions we need to con-
front directly the largest issues of just what it is that a free speech regime—
legal and otherwise—is designed to accomplish.
CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF THE LAW
There is more that can and should be said about the law of interference
with demonstrations, such as it is, but, as is so often the case, the behavior
that takes place in the world is often more or less than what the law permits
or requires.143  Although this Article has commenced with the hard law of
the First Amendment as it has in the past and does now apply to the problem
of the hostile audience, that inquiry has exposed some larger issues about
speaker and listener behavior beyond the law.  For all but the self-expression
justifications for freedom of speech,144 and thus under the arguments from
truth finding and from democratic deliberation,145 among others, free
speech is about a certain kind of environment in which we learn from each
other, deliberate with each other, and engage in forms of collective commu-
nicative activity.  In important respects the actively hostile audience chal-
lenges not only the speaker, but also the legal and social environment in
which the speakers are protected.  But whether that challenge, in the age of
the neo-Nazis, in the age of the resurgence of the Klan, and in the age of the
believe, correctly, that picketers against a speaker whose picketing is outside the venue
have First Amendment rights to picket no less than the First Amendment rights of the
speaker, but we would be foolish to deny that such picketing may at times simply change
the nature of the speaker’s speech.  Just as Marcel Duchamp’s mustached Mona Lisa has
made it impossible for me ever to see the real Mona Lisa without distractingly wondering
where the mustache is, and just as The Lone Ranger has made it for most people of my
generation impossible to undistractedly appreciate Gioachino Rossini’s William Tell Over-
ture, see Frederick Schauer, The Ontology of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRAC-
TICES OF CULTURAL REGULATION 147, 147, 157 (Robert C. Post ed., 1998), so too can
counterprotesters alter the nature of a speaker’s speech without ever engaging in physical
interference and thus without ever risking legal liability.  But when the counterprotesters
should do so, when we should praise or castigate them for doing it, and whether such
actions are inconsistent with the deeper purposes of free speech regime, are questions that
go beyond and beneath the law, even as they may be more important than the questions
about the law.
143 See Risa Goluboff, Where Do We Go From Here?, in CHARLOTTESVILLE 2017: THE LEGACY
OF RACE AND INEQUITY, supra note 1, at 82.
144 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
145 See VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 318–474, 766–875 (2006);
SCHAUER, supra note 141, at 15–46.
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rise of other white supremacist speakers, is fundamentally sound or funda-
mentally misguided is a question that can hardly be answered in the context
of the more focused treatment offered here.
